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In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick contends that the 
fundamental question of political philosophy is whether there should be a 
political state at all. "Why not," he asks, "have anarchy?"1 This is a 
serious question which, he insists, demands consideration prior to any 
discussion of the proper structure of a political state. 
State of nature theory provides, in Nozick's estimation, the most 
profitable starting point for addressing the question of anarchy. In fact, he 
perceives a two-fold purpose in state of nature theory, the first 
justificatory, the second explanatory. In its justificatory role, state of nature 
theory establishes that if one can demonstrate that a political state (a) 
would be superior to the best situation of anarchy (i.e., state of nature) 2 
which can reasonably be hoped for, (b) would come into being without 
taking any morally impermissible steps, that is, without violating anyone's 
natural rights, or (c) would be an improvement over the state of nature, then 
formation of a political state is justified.3 The explanatory purpose of state 
of nature theory relates to what Nozick calls a "fundamental explanation of 
(a| realm."4 Such an explanation is valuable because it explains the realm 
in terms of its most basic, important, and unavoidable features. Hence, he 
maintains that if one can explain the political realm in terms of the 
nonpolitical (the state of nature), then one has achieved the most desirable 
and complete fundamental explanation of the political realm possible. 
The plausibility of Nozick's admittedly "libertarian" 5 political 
philosophy thus turns in large part upon the state of nature which 
undergirds it. In this paper 1 suggest that shortcomings in his formulation of 
that state of nature undermine his political theory's credibility. In 
particular, I argue that the state of nature he conceives rests upon two 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 
1974), p. 4. All citations in text are to this source. 
throughout Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick conceives of anarchy in 
terms of the traditional state of nature. This comes across most clearly in 
the Preface where he parenthetically describes 'anarchy' "as (that 
situation] represented by Locke's state of nature." Nozick, p. xi. 
3Nozick, p. 5. Although Nozick expresses these three points in the 
disjunctive as separate considerations, it is not apparent from the text how 
(a) 'superior to' and (c) 'improvement over' differ. 
4Nozick, p. 6. Emphasis in original. 
5SAX Nozick, p. ix. 
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crucial assumptions (1) the generally moral character of its inhabitants, 
and (2) their possession of certain natural rights - neither of which is 
sufficiently developed nor even consistently adhered to in Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia. Moreover, and more critically, these assumptions together do 
not lead to the construction of a state of nature which fulfills the 
justificatory purpose Nozick delineated for state of nature theory. His state 
of nature cannot be used to justify the political state over a situation of 
anarchy. 
1. NOZICKS STATE OF NATURE 
As noted, Nozick's state of nature rests upon two critical assumptions. 
The first concerns the basic moral character of the people who inhabit it. 
Nozick fashions his state of nature as "a nonstate situation in which people 
generally satisfy moral constraints and generally act as they ought" (p. 5). 
It is neither a Hobbesian "minimax" nightmare (p. 5), where life is 
"solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,"6 nor is it a purely optimistic 
"maximax" dreamworld (p. 5), a forever innocent Garden of Eden. Rather, it 
is the best anarchic situation one can reasonable expect. People in it do not 
always act as they should, but generally they do. 
The second crucial assumption Nozick makes in contriving his state of 
nature is that he endows the people within it with certain natural rights. 
Nowhere does he clearly spell out these natural rights. He simply 
fashions his state of nature as "something sufficiently similar to Locke's 
state of nature" (p. 9), containing a 'sufficiently similar' set of natural 
rights. Thus borrowing largely from Locke, Nozick roughly sketches a set of 
natural rights containing five basic freedoms: (1) an abstract right of 
freedom of action;7 (2) a right to acquire and hold property;8 (3) a right to 
6Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (1651; rpt. Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1968), p. 186. 
7Nozick introduces this abstract right of freedom of action with the very 
first words of his book: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no 
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong 
and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if 
anything, the state and its officials may do. How much room do individual 
rights leave for the state?" Nozick, p. ix. Since the very nature of his 
inquiry from the outset is thus to consider the scope of a just political state in 
a world where individuals have rights prior to the state's existence, it is 
clear the rights he is referring to are natural or inherent. That one, perhaps 
the most basic, of these rights is an abstract right to freedom of action 
plainly emerges from passages such as: "Our main conclusions about the 
state are that ... any more extensive state (than the minimal statel will 
violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is 
unjustified;" Nozick, p. ix, and "Individuals in Locke's state of nature are in 
'a state of perfect freedom to order their actions... as they think fit, within 
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the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or dependency upon 
the will of any other man.'" Nozick, p. 10, quoting John Locke, The Second 
Treatise of Government', in Tivo Treatises of Government, 2nd ed., ed. Peter 
Laslett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), sec. 4. 
8Nozick does not directly articulate this right until midway through 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia when he explains why the minimal state 
cannot morally permit redistribution of goods or wealth under what he 
regards as the theoretical ruse of distributive justice. See generally Nozick, 
ch. 7. A natural right to acquire and hold property underlies the 'principle 
of justice in acquisition', which in turn is the first principle in his 
entitlement theory of justice in distribution. See Nozick, p. 150 ff. The fact 
that he conceives of the right to acquire property as a natural right becomes 
even more clear in his discussion of Locke's theory of property, where he 
traces the Lockean notion that property originates through mixing one's 
labor with things. Nozick, pp. 171, 174-75. Furthermore, the right to 
property receives implicit recognition early in Nozick's book when he 
discusses the Lockean state of nature he adopts. Though he does not 
directly affirm the right, he does affirm rights for all inhabitants of the 
state of nature to "dispose of their possessions... as they think fit," and to be 
secure in their "life, health, liberty, or possessions." Nozick, p. 10. Both of 
these rights necessarily require prior recognition of a right to property. 
'The right of contract first enters into Nozick's formulation of the state of 
nature in his initial Lockean specification of rights: "individuals in Locke's 
state of nature are in 'a state of perfect freedom to ... dispose of their 
possessions and persons as they think fit....'" Nozick, p. 10, quoting Locke, 
Second Treatise, sec. 4. This right reappears in the discussion of his 
entitlement theory, where it forms the basis of his second principle of justice 
in holdings, the principle of justice in transfer. Nozick, p. 150. 
l 0Nozick also derives the right of non-aggression from Locke, lie states: 
'The bounds of the law of nature require that 'no one ought to harm another 
in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."' Nozick, p. 10. 
contractual relations (that is, a right to transfer or alienate any of one's 
holdings or rights);9 (4) a right of non-aggression (i.e., a right not to be 
harmed in one's person or property);10 and (5) a right of enforcement (i.e, a 
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M The right of enforcement, as we will see, is the pivotal natural right for 
Nozick's derivation of the political state. He uses it to justify the 
evolutionary movement from the state of nature through protective 
associations to the dominant protective association and, finally, the 
minimal state. We find this right inherent in his state of nature: "In a 
state of nature an individual may himself enforce his rights, defend 
himself, exact compensation, and punish (or at least try his best to do so). 
Others may join with him in his defense, at his call." Nozick, p. 12. Like 
the other natural rights, Nozick borrows his right of enforcement from 
Locke. Sec Nozick, p. 10. 
right to punish or exact compensation from those who violate one's own or 
others' rights)." 
Recognition of these rights is central to Nozick's argument that a 
minimal political state is justified. Following Locke, he acknowledges 
there are certain inconveniences in the state of nature. Rather than 
considering these inconveniences sufficient ground, as Locke does, for 
establishing a political state, however, Nozick begins by considering what 
arrangements may be made within the state of nature to remedy them (pp. 
10-11). 
The set of natural rights, in particular the rights of nonaggression and 
enforcement, permits individuals in the state of nature to enforce their 
rights, defend themselves, and punish and exact compensation from 
aggressors. The right of enforcement further allows them to seek recompense 
for harm done to others. Nozick posits that these rights would lead groups 
of individuals to join together in the formation of mutual-protection 
associations (p. 12). These protective associations will each establish 
procedures for intra-association strife as well as conflict between members 
and nonmembers. The pressures of a totally free market, the need for 
division of labor, economies of scale, and so on, together with rational self-
interest will lead to strong competition between protective associations (pp. 
16-17). The weaker, less efficient associations will go out of business as 
people flock to the associations which guarantee the best protection for the 
cheapest cost. Ultimately, a single protective association (or a federation 
of united agencies) will gain dominance in a particular geographical area. 
Nozick calls that association the Dominant Protective Association (p. 
15ff). 
Nozick seriously considers the possibility that the dominant protective 
agency constitutes a minimal political state. Have we, in other words, 
already left the state of nature? He appears to conclude at first we have 
not, but then, on second thought, perhaps we have. The dominant protective 
association lacks two features traditionally considered essential to the 
existence of a political state. First, it allows some people to enforce their 
own rights, and hence does not possess a de jure monopoly on force (pp. 22-24, 
51). And second, it does not provide protective services to all people 
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12Nozick, p. 89. Emphasis in original. 
13Nozick, p. 115. See generally chap. 4 
14Nozick, p. 27. Emphasis in original. 
within its jurisdiction, but only to those who pay for them (pp. 22-24, 51). 
Thus, the dominant protective association is not a political state even 
within the definition of the minimal night-watchman state of classical 
liberal theory (p. 25). 
The dominant protective association certainly constitutes something 
more, however, than the plethora of competing private protective 
associations out of which it grew. Although the dominant agency does not 
possess a de jure monopoly on force, its consolidation of power permits it to 
enjoy a de facto monopoly (p. 108ff). Once power has become concentrated in 
it, the dominant protective agency will regard its own procedures of 
criminal justice as reliable and fair, and will employ them at will (p. 108). 
Nonmembers will be prohibited from ignoring these procedures or defending 
against them (p. 108). Contrariwise, the dominant agency will be bound to 
recognize no other set of criminal procedures. "It, and it alone," stresses 
Nozick, "enforces prohibitions on others' procedures of justice, as it sees fit" 
(p. 108). It, and it alone, will have the power to force all others to heed its 
procedures of justice, while it will abide only by those (if any) it freely 
chooses to recognize (p. 109). In this manner the dominant protective 
association comes to possess a de facto monopoly. And when it does, it no 
longer occupies the state of nature, but has evolved into a political entity, 
the ultraminimal state (p. 26). 
Nozick completes this "invisible-hand explanation" (pp. 18-19, 119) of 
the evolutionary development of a political state by arguing that the 
ultraminimal state will evolve into the minimal state (pp. 113-114). The 
sole function of the ultraminimal state is to protect and seek requital for 
violations of the rights of its paying members (pp. 26, 27). It performs this 
function under the authority of its "legitimate powers," which "are merely 
the sum of the individual rights that its members or clients transfer to 
(it)." 1 2 With those rights, however, the ultraminimal state takes on certain 
obligations. Among those is the obligation to respect and not impinge upon 
the rights of nonmembers (pp. 27-28). Formation of a dominant protective 
association, however, and its de facto evolution into the ultraminimal state 
encroaches upon the rights of nonmembers to engage in self-help activities, 
pursuant to the right of enforcement, against members of the dominant 
agency. Denial of these self-help enforcement rights entitles nonmembers to 
compensation. 1 3 And providing that compensation transforms the 
ultraminimal state into the minimal state (p. 119). 
Although the provision of compensation in the form of protective 
services to nonmembers appears redistributive, Nozick maintains it is not. 
The word "redistributive," he claims, refers to "types of reasons for an 
arrangement," not to the arrangement itself.1 4 The provision of goods or 
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services to one group of people by assessing the costs thereof to another is 
'redistributive', therefore, only if its "major supporting reasons" are 
redistributive (p. 27). Nozick contends the provision of protective services 
by the dominant protective association to nonmembcrs is not redistributive 
because its 'major supporting reason' stems from the principle of 
compensation (p. 115). No one in the dominant agency has redistributive 
intent. The reason for compensation is moral. Because the dominant agency 
possesses a de facto monopoly on force, the principle of compensation 
requires its members to pay for the protection of those whom they, jointly as 
members of the dominant protective association, have prohibited from self-
help enforcement against them (p. 119). And since he has assumed that 
people generally act as morality requires, Nozick concludes that such 
compensation will be paid (p. 119). 
In this manner Nozick believes he has sufficiently answered the 
question of anarchy. He has explained the legitimate nature of a political 
state. And he has demonstrated how such a state justifiably emerges out of 
the anarchical situation of the state of nature. Or has he? Must we accept 
his construction of the state of nature upon which his theory rests? Is he 
justified in making his two crucial assumptions regarding the general moral 
character of people and the natural rights they possess in the state of 
nature? Is he faithful to these assumptions throughout the course of his 
invisible-hand explanation of the minimal state's evolution? To these 
questions we now turn. 
II. THE GENERALLY MORAL CH ARCTER OF PEOPLE 
How does Nozick's assumption that people generally act according to 
morality affect his evolutionary development of the state? Recall that 
Nozick rejected both pessimistic and roseate descriptions of people in the 
state of nature, preferring instead a conservatively optimistic middle 
ground. Few would dispute his declining to adopt a Utopian state of nature. 
But why not the Hobbesian "minimax" standard? Is not that touchstone, 
with it's assumption that people are basically greedy and self-serving 
(though not necessarily evil), as realistic as the 'generally moral' standard 
Nozick espouses? Nozick offers little argument for his preference for the 
latter. He simply states that no political state incorporating a pessimistic 
view of human nature would be superior to a pessimistically described state 
of nature (p. 5). 
This assertion apparently refers to two of Nozick's three justificatory 
criteria attending state of nature theory. Those two criteria aver that 
formation of a political state is justified if it is (1) 'superior to' or (2) an 
'improvement over' the state of nature (p. 5). The third criterion holds that 
the political state must come about by 'morally permissible means' (p. 5), 
that is, without infringing the natural rights of those who occupy the state 
of nature. Nozick then proceeds, in his invisible-hand explanation of the 
minimal state's development, to focus almost exclusively on the latter 
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criterion. The gist of his invisible-hand explanation, in other words, is to 
demonstrate that the minimal political state is justified because it can issue 
from the state of nature without proceeding along a morally impermissible 
path. 
Why then the 'superior to' and 'improvement over' criteria? Nozick 
presents his three criteria in the disjunctive. Presumably, therefore, he 
considers the political state justified if any one of the three is satisfied. 
Since his invisible-hand explanation of the minimal state's development 
turns on the 'morally permissible means' criterion, the 'superior to' and 
'improvement over' criteria do not appear necessary for his justification of 
the state. He could have proceeded just as well by assuming a Hobbesian 
"minimax" perspective on human behavior. That is, he could have 
proceeded just as well unless his 'generally moral' assumption plays a 
further behind-the-scenes role in his evolutionary argument for the 
minimal state. 
It does. The 'generally moral' assumption appears as a central notion 
at one juncture in Nozick's invisible-hand argument for the state. The 
principle of compensation demands that members of the dominant 
protective association provide protective services for nonmembers denied 
their self-help enforcement rights because of the dominant agency's de facto 
monopoly on force. Nozick expressly states that the members of the 
dominant protective association will heed the principle of compensation 
because he has "assumed that generally people will do what they are 
morally required to do" (p. 119). Only after acknowledging this reliance 
upon the 'generally moral' assumption does Nozick conclude he has 
successfully answered the question of anarchy. 
I see nothing objectionable in this reliance by itself. What is 
objectionable is Nozick's failure to resolutely adhere to the 'generally 
moral' assumption throughout the invisible-hand evolution of the state. 
He draws upon it when, as in regard to the principle of compensation, it 
serves his purposes; but he ignores it when it does not. This inconsistent 
application of the assumption is apparent from the following 
considerations. 
The first stage Nozick identifies in the evolutionary development of 
the political state is the emergence of private protective associations out of 
the state of nature (p. 12). Why do the inhabitants of the state of nature 
choose to form these protective associations? Nozick describes the reason as 
follows: 
In a state of nature, the understood natural law may not provide for 
every contingency in a proper fashion, and men who judge in their own 
case will always give themselves the benefit of the doubt and assume 
that they are in the right. They will overestimate the amount of harm 
or damage they have suffered, and passions will lead them to attempt 
to punish others more than proportionately and to exact excessive 
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compensation. Thus private and personal enforcement of one's rights 
(including those rights that are violated when one is excessively 
punished) leads to feuds, to an endless series of acts of retaliation and 
exactions of compensation. And there is no firm way to settle such a 
dispute, to end it and to have both parties know it is ended. Even if one 
party says he'll stop his acts of retaliation, the other can rest secure 
only if he knows that the first still does not feel entitled to gain 
recompense or to exact retribution, and therefore entitled to try when a 
promising occasion presents itself. Any method a single individual 
might use in an attempt irrevocably to bind himself into ending his 
part in a feud would offer insufficient assurance to the other party; 
tacit agreements to stop also would be unstable. Such feelings of being 
mutually wronged can occur even with the clearest right and with joint 
agreement on the facts of each person's conduct; all the more is there 
opportunity for such retaliatory battle when the facts or the rights are 
to some extent unclear.15 
This description of the state of nature sounds strikingly Hobbesian. No 
one trusts anyone else. Everyone judges disputes to his or her own 
advantage. Feuds unfold and continue incessantly. Even when actual 
hostilities are not occurring, their threat looms overhead. Labelling 
existence a "warre... of every man, against every man" 1 6 seems appropriate 
for this jungle. 
But whatever happened to the state of nature where "people... 
generally act as they ought"? That crucial justificatory assumption, so 
important to Nozick's contention that members of the dominant protective 
association will compensate those whose right to enforcement they've 
violated, is noticably absent from his description of the state of nature and 
its shortcomings. We can attempt to iron out this inconsistency either by 
incorporating the 'generally moral' assumption into his description of the 
state of nature, or by removing it when it crops up to usher in the principle of 
compensation. Either attempt, however, will thwart Nozick's main 
objective - to justify the political state over anarchy. 
If we choose the former route and actually assume that people in the 
state of nature will usually act as they ought, the need for mutual-
protection associations disappears. These people would be in general 
trustworthy. They would usually judge disputes, even those in which they 
were parties, fairly. Seldom would feuds develop. Existence in this state of 
nature would not be reducible to a war of all against all. And Nozick's 
mission to derive the minimal state by means of an invisible-hand would 
never get off the ground. There simply would not be sufficient need. The 
inhabitants of the state of nature would be relatively content with their 
15Nozick, pp. 11-12. Emphasis in original. 
, 6Hobbes. p. 185. 
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lot, and, recognizing the value of their natural rights, they would steer 
clear of any arrangements that could possibly place those rights in 
Jeopardy. To these people, the prospect of a political state, or even of a 
protective association, would likely seem a forbidding and oppressive 
intrusion into a relatively good life. Hence, in the state of nature they 
would remain. 
Nozick's program also fails if we resolve the Hobbesian/'generally 
moral' inconsistency by withdrawing his reliance on the latter when it 
arises in conjunction with the principle of compensation. Under this 
alternative, we assume that people at every stage in the evolutionary 
development of that state will act in a Hobbesian manner. Considering the 
final stage in that development, would members of the dominant protective 
agency still compensate those whose rights to self-help they've abridged? 
No. Untrustworthy people, always judging to their own benefit, who cannot 
rest without owning the last lick of retaliation, can hardly be expected to 
freely compensate others once they realize they hold all the power. 
Reveling in their de facto monopoly on force, they would certainly eschew 
the principle of compensation. But without that principle Nozick cannot 
even attain, let alone justify, the minimal state. He is left holding the 
ultraminimal state with its de facto monopoly which, if not tempered with 
compensation, impinges upon the rights of nonmembers. To end the process 
at that stage of uncorrected (and uncorrectable) encroachments of rights 
leaves Nozick susceptible to anarchistic objections. 
Hence, Nozick's assumption that people in the state of nature are 
generally moral plays a critical role in his invisible-hand explanation of 
the political state. But his inconsistent application of that assumption 
imperils his entire program. We will now turn to further endangerment, for 
a serious problem surrounds the scope of the natural rights he ascribes to 
inhabitants of the state of nature. 
III. NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPENSATION 
As his second crucial assumption, Nozick suggests that people in the 
state of nature enjoy certain natural rights. Most of these he never directly 
articulates. Indeed, he forewarns us that he will knowingly (if not 
deliberately) shroud these rights in vagueness. In both the Preface and 
Chapter One of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick cautions that he will 
not present a developed theory of the moral basis underlying the natural 
rights he posits. 1 7 Following what he terms "the respectable tradition of 
Locke" (p. 9), he simply rests those rights upon "general features that I he) 
believe|s| such |a] theorlyl would have were jit] worked out" (p. xiv). 
Despite this foggy presentation, it is possible to glean five natural 
rights to which Nozick gives at least token recognition, and which are 
central to his invisible-hand explanation of the political state. I earlier 
1 7Soe Nozick, pp. xiv, 9. 
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identified these rights as an abstract right of freedom of action, a right to 
acquire and hold property, a right to enter into contractual relations, a right 
of non-aggression, and a right of enforcement. Nozick's postulation of these 
natural rights plays a two-fold role in his political theory. First, it helps 
to define the state of nature from which the political state evolves. And 
second, it provides a yardstick by which to judge whether the political 
state is justified. 
In defining the state of nature and positing the natural rights held by 
its inhabitants, Nozick adopts a stringently individualistic and atomistic 
account. All natural rights are individual rights (pp. ix, 10, 118). They 
benefit their holder, and can only be waived by his or her free and express 
consent. Moreover, each natural right is separate and distinct from the 
others (pp. 10-12). The combination of any pair or even all five does not 
imply any rights or powers irreducible to any one. 
This individualistic and atomistic posture carries over to the political 
state, as well as the dominant protective agency and all intermediate 
protective associations. Neither the state nor any collective amalgamation 
of individuals can possess rights different or greater than those of its 
members (p. 118). The lawful powers of the state, the dominant protective 
association, and every private protective agency are strictly limited to 
"the sum of the individual rights that its members or clients transfer to (it]" 
(p. 89). Nozick stresses this point by stating, "No new rights and powers 
arise; each right of the (state or| association is decomposable without 
residue into those individual rights held by distinct individuals acting 
alone in a state of nature" (p. 89). 
Despite this clear disclaimer of any intention to increase the scope of 
the natural rights in the final stages of his evolutionary program, Nozick 
does just that. He scuttles his atomistic approach by tacitly approving acts 
of power by the dominant agency which exceed the cumulative force of the 
rights its members transfered to it. 
As we have seen, the essence of Nozick's final evolutionary move is the 
payment of compensation. The ultraminimal state becomes the minimal 
state when it compensates nonmembers for impinging upon their rights (pp. 
113, 119). Because this payment of compensation appears redistributive, 
the dominant protective association has finally become a political state. 
But why can the dominant protective association/minimal state violate the 
rights of nonmembers so long as it pays compensation? Could any number of 
its members do this? Let us return for a moment to the state of nature. Could 
a single powerful individual forcefully infringe the rights of others merely 
because he promised (as a 'generally moral' person?) to compensate them for 
their losses? Certainly not. Nozick consistently stresses that although all 
rights can be waived, they can only be waived with the right-holder's free 
consent. What about a small first-stage protective association? Could its 
members morally play the part of a mini-dominant protective association 
by denying others their self-help enforcement rights and then compensating 
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therefore? By force, perhaps; morally, no. Such forceful denials of rights, 
even when supplemented by compensation, abridge the natural rights 
Nozick deems inherent in the state of nature. Since his principal 
justification for the minimal state is its emergence by morally permissible 
means, he obviously cannot sanction these hypothetical situations, even 
when tempered with compensation. 
How then can Nozick approve such action by the dominant protective 
association? If the dominant agency's powers consist of nothing more than 
the sum of the natural rights of its members, how can it perform an action 
from which its members are prohibited? It cannot. The fact that Nozick 
allows it to indicates that the powers he ascribes to the dominant 
protective association are greater than the sum of its members' rights. The 
natural rights he postulates are not sufficient conditions for the minimal 
state to evolve out of the ultraminimal state. Even with the adoption of a 
fair and reliable system of criminal justice, 1 8 the ultraminimal state 
violates the self-help enforcement rights of nonmembers. Nozick cannot 
overcome this barrier with the natural rights as originally introduced. 
Those rights provide no license for knowing and purposeful violations of 
others' rights, even if they are mollified by compensation. No individual 
in the state of nature can appeal to the principle of compensation when he 
or she should be respecting others' rights. Hence, neither can the dominant 
protective association. If its powers truly cannot exceed the sum of its 
members' rights, then the dominant agency cannot legitimize violating 
others' rights by invoking a principle not contained in the rights it inherits. 
Since Nozick allows it to do just that, he obviously is expanding its powers 
in a manner he himself defines as morally impermissible. 
This expansion permits Nozick to complete his evolutionary saga of 
the state's development. Without it he could never have reached the 
minimal political state. Paradoxically, however, in doing so, he 
compromises his invisible-hand program. The justice of Thrasymachus does 
not influence natural rights as they are enjoyed in the state of nature. But it 
certainly amends them by the time the dominant protective association is 
transformed into the minimal state. The dominant agency, by virtue of its 
de facto monopoly on force, wields power derived simply from might. The 
aggregative force of the natural rights of individuals increases when the 
dominant protective agency holds it all. Since his justification of the 
political state rests, however, on its emergence by morally permissible 
means, Nozick's program once again collapses. Expanding the dominant 
agency's powers beyond the rights transfered to it by its members is a 
strikingly impermissible step. Since it is necessary for completion of his 
invisible-hand program, Nozick cannot achieve his objective - he cannot 
justify the political state. 
18Nozick, p. % ff. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Several problems beset Nozick's attempt to justify the political state. 
To successfully overcome the question of anarchy, he maintains that an 
invisible-hand explanation of the political state is necessary. Placing the 
foundation of that explanation in state of nature theory, he avers the 
political state is justified if it can emerge without recourse to morally 
impermissible means. The state of nature he designs for this program, 
however, rests on two crucial assumptions. People are 'generally moral,' 
and in the state of nature they enjoy certain natural rights. 
Critical examination of his invisible-hand program in light of these 
two assumptions reveals a number of problems. He applies neither 
assumption consistently in all stages he passes through. And attempts to 
remove the inconsistencies undermine the very structure of his program. 
Moreover, the natural rights he attributes to people in the state of nature 
are not sufficient to derive the minimal political state. In order to reach 
that stage, he must broaden their scope. Doing so, however, involves taking 
morally impermissible steps. Hence, he's trapped in a dilemma which 
undercuts his justificatory objective by foiling his attempt to justify the 
political state over the persistent question of anarchy. 
